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SECURITY DEPOSITS IN NEW YORK: HOW
SAFE IS YOUR MONEY?
I. Introduction
For tenants everywhere, the payment of a security deposit on an
apartment lease is an expected but unwelcome formality. To some
it is a mere annoyance, while to others it may be a decisive factor
in the search for a place to live. For most tenants, it is a payment
made with uncertainty, deserving of more than a casual surrender
to the fine print of a lease.
In New York, where there has never been a general landlord's
statutory or common law lien,' the growth of the cities and the
consequent legal development of the landlord-tenant relationship
has enhanced the importance of the leasehold agreement.2 In antici-
pation of an area's growth, real estate owners invest large sums for
the creation and maintenance of apartments and offices. 3 With
rapid apartment turnover rates and the rise and fall of an uncertain
free enterprise system, landlords, seeking protection beyond ten-
ants' personal assurances that the lease will be honored, require- a
provision for a security deposit in the lease. The protection the
landlord deserves, and the fundamental purpose of the deposit, is
to secure to the landlord the tenants' compliance with the covenants
of the lease.4
Whether the landlord-tenant relationship is one of debtor-
creditor, pledgor-pledgee, or trustee-cestui que trust, payment of a
security deposit has been widely abused for the landlord's gain.5
Where the tenant's deposit is threatened,6 it is obvious that a tenant
1. 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.73 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952).




5. See, e.g., cases cited notes 19, 60-63, 66-70 infra. See also Harris, A
Reveille to Lessees, 15 S. CAL. L. REv. 412 (1942).
6. For example, where the landlord converts the money and invests it,
or where he has demanded the money as something beyond security, such
as the prepayment of rent.
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should be afforded protection.7 Yet in New York this protection
remains weak.8
The landlord's ill-defined duties as a debtor at common law have
been brought into sharper focus by statutes' which have made him
a trustee of the tenants' money.'0 The landlord's duties include
holding security deposits separate from personal funds," and taking
certain prescribed measures to protect tenants' money upon convey-
ance of the fee.'" Moreover, if the landlord owns a building contain-
ing six or more dwelling units, he is required to bank tenants' money
and accumulate interest thereon for the tenants' benefit.'" The
Attorney General now has standing to sue and enforce directly all
statutory provisions concerning security deposits.'4
The common law, however, prevails in one important area- the
fate of a deposit upon the tenant's breach of a lease.'" New York
courts have attempted to apply certain well-settled principles of
fairness to probe parties' intent and minimize the literal language
of the lease.'" Yet problems remain in the area of common law
breach and in the application of the statutory provisions.'"
This Comment will trace the common law in New York, and
examine the development of the statutory law. It will indicate cer-
tain remaining problems and emphasize certain inequities that de-
serve legislative scrutiny.
II. The Security Deposit At Common Law
At common law, New York courts devoted considerable attention
7. "It is submitted that proper protection of the lessee is thoroughly
consistent with equal proper protection of the lessor. The lessor has no
right to treat a deposit as his own, nor has he the right to treat it 'as rent,'
for, among other things, it is incongruous to collect 'rent' when no attend-
ant use is given of the demised premises." Harris, supra note 5, at 424.
8. See text accompanying notes 71-73 infra.
9. N.Y. GEN. OBuG. LAW § 7-103(1) (McKinney Supp. 1974).
10. Id. §§ 7-103, -105 (McKinney Supp. 1974).
11. Id. § 7-103.
12. Id. § 7-105.
13. Id. § 7-103(2-a).
14. Id. § 7-107.
15. See generally id. § 7-103.
16. See notes 77-83 infra and accompanying text.
17. See notes 60-70, 91-97, 116, 123-27 infra and accompanying text.
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to the landlord-tenant relationship and to the manner in which this
relationship was affected by the tenant's security deposit. 8 When a
lessee deposited money with his landlord as security for the perform-
ance of a lease, courts held that the relationship created was that
of debtor and creditor." These courts further reasoned that the rela-
tionship should be governed by the parties' intent. Absent any find-
ings of contrary intention, most courts held that a debtor-creditor
relationship was created."0 A minority, however, found that the de-
posit of security created a fiduciary relationship between landlord
and tenant.2' Under this theory, a landlord was declared a trustee
of tenants' money, 22 the security deposit becoming a trust fund
rather than a debt.2 3 Since the New York Court of Appeals never
ruled definitively on this issue,2' the conflict continued until re-
solved by legislation.2 5
As case law developed it became apparent that the landlord en-
joyed a favored position before the New York courts.21 Mendelson-
18. See notes 20-40 infra and accompanying text.
19. Levinson v. Shapiro, 238 App. Div. 158, 263 N.Y.S. 585 (1st Dep't),
aff'd, 263 N.Y. 591, 189 N.E. 713 (1933); Jahmes Co. v. Propper, 238 App.
Div. 326, 264 N.Y.S. 219 (1st Dep't 1933); Mendelson-Silverman, Inc. v.
Malco Trading Corp., 146 Misc. 215, 260 N.Y.S. 881 (Sup. Ct. 1932), aff'd,
238 App. Div. 852, 262 N.Y.S. 291 (2d Dep't), aff'd, 262 N.Y. 621, 188 N.E.
92 (1933).
20. See cases cited note 19 supra.
21. See, e.g., In re Atlas, 217 App. Div. 38, 216 N.Y.S. 490 (4th Dep't
1926); Euclid Holding Co. v. Kermaco Realty Co., 131 Misc. 466, 227
N.Y.S. 103 (Mun. Ct. 1928); Alumor Garage, Inc. v. Stivers, Inc., 128 Misc.
400, 218 N.Y.S. 683 (Mun. Ct. 1926).
22. See notes 43, 55 infra and accompanying text.
23. Id.
24. Cf. Sagone v. Mackey, 225 N.Y. 594, 122 N.E. 621 (1919) where the
court was confronted not with the relationship of landlord-tenant but of
principal and agent. The court stated: "We shall pass the proposition
which certainly may be argued with much force that the final arrangement
under which plaintiff left her moneys with defendant was that of a simple
deposit creating the ordinary relation of creditor and debtor. . . ." Id. at
598, 122 N.E. at 622.
25. See notes 41-44 infra and accompanying text.
26. Cf. In re Banner, 149 F. 936 (S.D.N.Y. 1907). In this case the tenant
deposited five thousand dollars with his landlord as security for the punc-
tual payment and performance of the covenants and agreements of the
lease. The lease required the landlord to pay interest on the deposit and
1974]
82 FORDHAM URBAN LA W JOURNAL
Silverman, Inc. v. Malco Trading Corp. 2 involved security depos-
ited to guarantee tenants' faithful performance of the lease cove-
nan't. I Jnder its terms the landlord was required to pay interest, and
to place the deposit in escrow six months prior to the termination
of the agreement. A tenant defaulted on his rental payments and
the landlord instituted a summary dispossession proceeding. Upon
discovering that the landlord commingled the security with his gen-
eral funds and diverted it to his own benefit, the tenant counter-
claimed for conversion. The Appellate Term, Second Department,
in attempting to formulate a general rule stated:
The relation in which the security is to be held is a matter of agreement
between the parties. For instance, they might provide in the lease that the
security is to be held in trust or in some other fiduciary relation by the
landlord. This might be done either by express language or by language
which necessarily justifies the inference that such was the parties' intent. In
such a case the use of the security by the landlord for his own purposes would
amount to a conversion. If the lease, however, contains no such provisions,
the relation existing will be deemed to be that of debtor and creditor. For
instance, where the lease provides that the security has been deposited with
the landlord for the faithful performance of the lease by the tenant and is to
be returned to the tenant upon expiration of the term, the landlord will be
deemed to have the right to use the money, and will not be guilty of conver-
sion in so doing."
Although this statement of the law was cited with approval by the
First Department of the Appellate Division, 9 confusion resulted
the tenant was given the opportunity to substitute other "suitable secu-
rity" for his deposit. If he met his obligations, the landlord would apply
the security to the last six months' rent. The court, applying New York
law, ruled that this agreement merely created a debtor-creditor relation-
ship. Id. at 938.
27. 146 Misc. 215, 26() N.Y.S. 881 (Sup. Ct. 1932),
28. Id. at 216, 260 N.Y.S at 882.
29 Levinson v. Shapiro, 238 App. Div 158, 263 N Y.S. 585 (1st Dep't).
aff'd. 263 N.Y. 591, 189 N.E 713 (1933). Here the tenant deposited a sum
of money as security for the faithful performance of a two-year lease; when
he defaulted on his payments, the landlord sued. Asserting that the rela-
tionship between them was fiduciary in nature, the tenant counterclaimed
for conversion of his security. While proclaiming that no rigid rule could
be formulated, the court held that the agreement between the parties
would control and that Mendelson stated the correct rule: "No hard and
fast rule can be laid down to govern the respective rights and liabilities of
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from the Fourth Department's decision in In re Atlas,3" and it was
largely through that case that the "trust fund doctrine" eventually
gained legislative3' and judicial32 acceptance. In Atlas the landlord
leased a theater to the tenant and required him to deposit five
thousand dollars to be held in escrow as security for'performance of
the lease.33 In fact, the landlord placed the deposit in a personal
bank account and depleted the tenant's security. When the tenant
failed to pay his monthly rent, the landlord instituted eviction pro-
ceedings. The tenant, citing the depletion of his security by the
landlord, counterclaimed for conversion. The court ruled favorably
on the counterclaim holding that the sum deposited by the lessee
did not become the property of the lessor.34 The money was en-
trusted to the landlord as security against the tenant's default in the
performance of the lease, and unless applied to such defaults the
security was to be held by the lessor "intact on deposit with some
bank."
5
The decision in Atlas received nominal judicial acceptance. Some
lower courts, prodded by the inherent inequities in the landlord-
tenant relationship, soon began to follow this interpretation.3 How-
a landlord and tenant with respect to the use or non-use of moneys paid
over to the landlord as security. The parties can stipulate that the deposit
be held intact and unused as a fund to be set apart; or they may fail to do
so. Here, they have not so contracted and the circumstances of the transac-
tion as well as the language of the lease itself do not indicate an intention
that this small sum was required to be kept in a separate fund .... The
nub of the matter is that if the parties had desired to restrict the landlord
in the use of the moneys, they would have so provided by appropriate
language." Id. at 160, 263 N.Y.S. at 587-88.
30. 217 App. Div. 38, 216 N.Y.S. 490 (4th Dep't 1926).
31. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 7-103 (McKinney Supp. 1974).
32. See, e.g., Sommers v. Timely Toys, Inc., 110 F. Supp. 844
(E.D.N.Y. 1953); Sadow v. Poskin Realty Corp., 63 Misc. 2d 499, 312
N.Y.S.2d 901 (Sup. Ct. 1970); Land v. Gladol, 18 Misc. 2d 103, 187
N.Y.S.2d 216 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
33. 217 App. Div. at 39-40, 216 N.Y.S. at 492.
34. Id. at 41-42, 216 N.Y.S. at 494.
35. Id.
36. In Alumor Garage, Inc. v. Stivers, Inc., 128 Misc. 400, 218 N.Y.S.
683 (Mun. Ct. 1926), the court held that the proper interpretation of the
lease agreement was that quoted in Atlas. Id. at 402, 218 N.Y.S. at 685.
The court further held that even though the landlord had invested the
19741
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ever, most courts were reluctant to impose a fiduciary relationship
upon the parties, finding Atlas to be limited to its particular facts."
Although the presence of an escrow clause possibly distinguishes
Atlas, it is difficult to comprehend how a decision on that set of facts
detracts from the general rule established by Mendelson.38
Some decisions following Atlas are not so easily reconcilable. 9
These cases construed the landlord-tenant relationship to be one of
money in state bonds, no conversion occurred since this constituted a valid
investment for trust funds under New York law. There was no duty on
behalf of the landlord to keep money on deposit in a bank since there was
no escrow provision as in Atlas. Id. at 402-03, 218 N.Y.S. at 686. In Euclid
Holding Co. v. Kermacoe Realty Co., 131 Misc. 466, 227 N.Y.S. 103 (Mun.
Ct. 1928), the argument that the security created only an indemnity con-
tract and not a fiduciary obligation was advanced and rejected as inappro-
priate. The court regarded Atlas and Alumor Garage as controlling. Id. at
468, 470, 227 N.Y.S. at 105, 108. In Frost v. Paulster Realty Corp., 138
Misc. 597, 247 N.Y.S. 808 (Westchester County Ct. 1930), the tenant
agreed to pay the security by various checks. One check was then endorsed
by the landlord over to his attorney. A second check was given by the
landlord to the agent who, in turn, endorsed it back to the tenant. Upon
the tenant's suit for breach of trust, the court, finding that the conduct of
the parties created a debtor-creditor relationship, said that if the division
of the security had not occurred with the knowledge and acquiescence of
the tenant, the deposit would be treated as a trust fund. Id. at 599, 247
N.Y.S. at 810. In an earlier case, the New York Supreme Court had occa-
sion to resolve a similar question, and its holding seems to have foresha-
dowed the Atlas decision. In Degnario v. Sire, 34 Misc. 163, 68 N.Y.S. 789
(Sup. Ct. 1901), a tenant sued for the alleged conversion of his security by
his landlord. The court held that money so deposited was money deposited
for a special purpose, and that title did not pass to the lessor. The landlord
was required to hold the security intact and return it to his lessee upon
compliance with the lease agreement, and failure to do so was a conversion.
Id. at 165, 68 N.Y.S. at 790.
37. See, e.g., Levinson v. Shapiro, 238 App. Div. 158, 160, 263 N.Y.S.
585, 588 (1st Dep't 1933); Goodman v. Schached, 144 Misc. 905, 910-11,
260 N.Y.S. 883, 888-89 (Nassau County Ct. 1932); Houston Varick Oper.
Corp. v. 206-208 Varick St. Corp., 142 Misc. 863, 865, 255 N.Y.S. 60, 62
(Mun. Ct. 1932).
38. 146 Misc. at 216, 260 N.Y.S. at 882.
39. See, e.g., Euclid Holding Co. v. Kermacoe Realty Co., 131 Misc.
466, 227 N.Y.S. 103 (Mun. Ct. 1928); Alumor Garage, Inc. v. Stivers, Inc.,
128 Misc. 400, 218 N.Y.S. 618 (Mun. Ct. 1926).
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trust absent an "escrow" provision. Implicit in their reasoning was
the idea that if the relationship was merely that of debtor-creditor,
the tenant could insist only upon a personal obligation of the land-
lord. This obligation, in turn, would be of little value in the event
of the landlord's insolvency. 0 If the relationship were one of trust,
however, the deposit becomes a trust fund which remains the prop-
erty of the lessee. This enables the tenant to repossess the deposit
in spite of the insolvency of the landlord, if the money is on hand.
Fortunately, the legislature did not permit the confusion within the
judicial system to fester.
III. Legislative Modifications of the Landlord's Duties
The New York Legislature has resolved much of the confusion and
discord perpetuated by the courts." The relationship between land-
40. People v. Horowitz, 309 N.Y. 426, 131 N.E.2d 715 (1956).
41. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 7-103 (McKinney Supp. 1974) reads as
follows: "1. Whenever money shall be deposited or advanced on a contract
or license agreement for the use or rental of real property as security for
performance of the contract or agreement or to be applied to payments
upon such contract or agreement when due, such money, with interest
accruing thereon, if any, until repaid or so applied, shall continue to ble
the money of the person making such deposit or advance and shall be held
in trust by the person with whom such deposit or advance shall be made
and shall not be mingled with the personal moneys or become an asset of
the person receiving the same, but may be disposed of as provided in
section 7-105 of this chapter. 2. Whenever the person receiving money so
deposited or advanced shall deposit such money in a banking organization,
such person shall thereupon notify in writing each of the persons making
such security deposit or advance, giving the name and address of the
banking organization in which the deposit of security money is made, and
the amount of such deposit. If the person depositing such security money
in a banking organization shall deposit same in an interest bearing ac-
count, he shall be entitled to receive, as administration expenses, a sum
equivalent to one per cent per annum upon the security money so depos-
ited, which shall be in lieu of all other administrative and custodial expen-
ses. The balance of the interest paid by the banking organization shall be
the money of the person making the deposit or advance and shall either
be held in trust by the person with whom such deposit or advance shall be
made, until repaid or applied for the use or rental of the leased premises,
or annually paid to the person making the deposit of security money. 2-a.
Whenever the money so deposited or advanced is for the rental of property
containing six or more family dwelling units, the person receiving such
19741
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lord and tenant can no longer be construed as that of debtor and
creditor:" rather it is now fiduciary in nature, 3 and the deposit
itself constitutes a trust fund which the landlord, as trustee, must
segregate and keep intact."
money shall, subject to the provisions of this section, deposit it in an
interest bearing account in a banking organization which account shall
earn interest at a rate which shall be the prevailing rate earned by other
such deposits made with banking organizations in such area. 2-b. In the
event that a lease terminates other than at a time that a banking organiza-
tion in such area regularly pays interest, the person depositing such secu-
rity money shall pay over to his tenant such interest as he is able to collect
at the date of such lease termination. 3. Any provision of such contract or
agreement whereby a person who so deposits or advances money waives
any provision of this section is absolutely void. 4. The term "real property"
as used in this section is co-extensive in meaning with lands, tenements
and hereditaments." With respect to the banking of such deposits by land-
lords, N.Y. BANKING LAW § 237(4) (McKinney Supp. 1974) provides: "Not-
withstanding any inconsistent provision of law, a savings bank may accept
deposits of moneys paid under and as security for the performance of any
lease or leases, or to be applied to payments under such lease or leases
when due, although the person depositing such moneys is held accountable
therefor as a trustee of trust funds. Moneys received from or held for
persons under more than one lease may be deposited in one or more ac-
counts. Notwithstanding any inconsistent provision of law, the word 'per-
son' as used in this subdivision four shall include an individual, municipal
corporation, partnership, corporation, association or any other organiza-
tion operated for profit."
42. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 7-103(1) (McKinney Supp. 1974).
43. Id. See also Sommers v. Timely Toys, Inc., 110 F. Supp. 844
(E.D.N.Y. 1953); People v. Horowitz, 309 N.Y. 426, 131 N.E.2d 715 (1956);
In re Perfection Technical Servs. Press, Inc., 22 App. Div. 2d 352, 256
N.Y.S.2d 166 (2d Dep't), aff'd, 18 N.Y.2d 644, 819 N.E.2d 424, 273
N.Y.S.2d 714 (1965).
44. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 7-103(1) (McKinney Supp. 1974); Som-
mers v. Timely Toys, Inc., 110 F. Supp. 844 (E.D.N.Y. 1953); Sadow v.
Poskin Realty Corp., 63 Misc. 2d 499, 312 N.Y.S.2d 901 (Sup. Ct. 1970);
Land v. Gladol, 18 Misc. 2d 103, 187 N.Y.S.2d 216 (Sup. Ct. 1959). The
statute, however, cannot be construed to protect security that is not for
performance of the lease. In Mercantile Exch. Leasing Corp. v. Astor-
Broadway Holding Corp., 4 Misc. 2d 135, 159 N.Y.S.2d 1003 (Sup. Ct.
1956), a ten-year lease was executed on November 15, 1955, but would not
commence until April 1, 1956. In the interim the tenant was to take prepa-
ratory steps toward using the space and was to deposit $25,000 with the
[Vol. III
SECURITY DEPOSITS
Section 7-103 of the New York General Obligations Law 5 operates
to protect a tenant against misappropriations of his security by his
landlord." As stated by the New York Court of Appeals:
In enacting section 233 [now section 7-1031, the Legislature was attempting
to prevent the depletion of funds deposited with the lessor. The method used
was to transform the usual debtor-creditor relationship between the lessor
and the lessee into one of trust relationship, by operation of law.47
landlord. The security would constitute liquidated damages in the event
of a breach. When the lessee cancelled and sued to recover his deposit, the
court held the statute inapplicable. Since the security related to the right
of the plaintiff to become a tenant and the performance of preliminary
obligations in connection with this right, the statute did not apply.
45. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 7-103 (McKinney Supp. 1974).
46. Mallory Associates v. Barving Realty Co., 300 N.Y. 297, 90 N.E.2d
468 (1949); accord, In re Pal-Playwell, Inc., 334 F.2d 389 (2d Cir. 1964);
People v. Horowitz, 309 N.Y. 426, 131 N.E.2d 715 (1956). See also Wald
v. Gold, 1 Misc. 2d 756, 147 N.Y.S.2d 250 (Sup. Ct. 1955), where the court
held that even though the deposit was made by a third party for the tenant,
the security was to be treated as if made by the tenant himself.
47. Mallory Associates v. Barving Realty Co., 300 N.Y. 297, 301-02, 90
N.E.2d 468, 471 (1949). As originally enacted, the statute applied only to
transfers of designated real estate, and did not protect licensees. In People
v. Horowitz, 309 N.Y. 426, 131 N.E.2d 715 (1956) a license was granted for
a concession in defendant's theaters, defendant depositing approximately
five thousand dollars to guarantee performance of the lease. The theaters
closed after three months, and the defendant refused to repay the se-
curity. The court of appeals found the statute inapplicable: "There may
be no essential reason on account of which the Legislature might not simi-
larly have protected a deposit of security by a licensee. Section 233 of the
Real Property Law [now N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 7-103(1)], however,
creates this fiduciary status only in the case of contracts 'for the use or
rental of real property.' That expression is well understood, and imports
the ordinary landlord and tenant relationship involving transfer of posses-
sion of designated space in real estate . . . . This kind of concession,
regardless of whether the contract describes the parties as landlord and
tenant, does not create that relationship in law in the absence of a demise
of space in a building." Id. at 428-29, 131 N.E.2d at 716; accord, Planetary
Recreations, Inc. v. Kerns, 184 Misc. 340, 54 N.Y.S.2d 418 (N.Y. City Ct.
1945), where plaintiff was granted a concession in defendant's restaurant
upon the payment of $6000. In plaintiff's suit for conversion the court held
the statute inapplicable because the agreement did not yield possession of
any particular part of the property.
1974]
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The New York Court of Appeals has also held that section 7-103
is not limited to deposits made under a contract for the use or rental
of real property situated in New York. In "Mallory Associates v.
Barving Realty Co. , landlord and tenant, New York corporations
with offices located in New York, executed a lease and deposited the
security in New York. The court held the statute applicable even
though the premises were located out of the state. The court found
no evidence that the legislature intended lio limit the statute to
deposits for the use of real property situated in New York.", Al-
though the court applied the statute in a situation involving non-
New York realty, it expressly disclaimed the granting of
extraterritorial operation. 0 Section 7-103 does not prevent the exist-
ence of a debtor-creditor relationship between a landlord and his
tenant. In Ja-Mo Associates; Inc. v. 56 Fulton St. Garage Corp.,"
the parties had executed a lease and attached a rider which pro-
vided that the tenant would "loan" the landlord forty thousand
dollars. The landlord was to execute a mortgage which would be
assigned by the tenant to the landlord as security for the tenant's
performance of the lease. After the tenant defaulted on his rental
payments, a stipulation was executed which gave the landlord pos-
session of the premises. The tenant then sued to recover his forty
thousand dollars deposit. The appellate division held the statute
inapplicable, pointing out that the forty thousand dollars was ac-
tually given as partial consideration for the lease, and not deposited
as security.2 The court noted:
48. 300 N.Y. 297, 90 N.E.2d 468 (1949).
49. Id. at 302, 90 N.E.2d at 471;-
50. Id. This section merely governs the rights and liabilities of New
York corporations under a contract executed in New York, and in reference
to New York subject matter-the security deposit. However, where the
landlord was a Florida resident, the realty located in Florida, the lease
largely negotiated and performed in Florida, and where the security de-
posit was maintained in Florida, this section did not apply. The commin-
,gling by the landlord, therefore, did not entitle the tenant to a return of
his security deposit. Alachua Inn Corp. v. Cooper, 66 Misc. 2d 479, 421
N.Y.S.2d 222 (Sup. Ct. 1971).
51. 30 App. Div. 2d 287, 291 N.Y.S.2d 62 (1st Dep't 1968); see In re
Amphitheatre, Inc., 405 F.2d 309 (2d Cir. 1968); 800 Union St. Corp. v.
Bookben Realty Corp., 278 App. Div. 708, 103 N.Y.S.2d 359, aff'd, 302
N.Y. 926, 100 N.E.2d 188 (1951).
52. 30 App. Div. 2d at 290, 291 N.Y.S.2d at 65-66.
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Although the mortgage securing the tenant's loan was assigned by it to the
landlord as security for the performance of the lease, the true nature of the
transaction was not thereby converted into one for the deposit of money as
security. The assigned mortgage was not cash security which could be com-
mingled by the landlord with his other assets. The mortgage transaction was
itself a means of furnishing the landlord with security in lieu of that provided
by section 7-103 . . . 3
In the absence of a contrary agreement, the landlord, upon receipt
of a security deposit, must segregate the fund and keep it intact. 4
He may not commingle the deposit with his own funds or in any way
use it for his own benefit.5 5 If he does, he may be liable for
conversion56 and forfeit any right to the deposit. 7 The tenant may
53. Id. The court also stated that it would not be bound by labels the
parties attached to the payments, and it would examine the true nature
of the transaction to determine whether the statute applied. See Pruden-
tial Westchester Corp. v. Tomasino, 5 App. Div. 2d 489, 172 N.Y.S.2d 652
(1st Dep't 1958); Bogart Packing Co. v. John-Jordan, Inc., 102 N.Y.S.2d
133 (Sup. Ct. 1950); J. RASCH, LANDLORD AND TENANT AND SUMMARY
PROCEEDINGS § 400 (2d ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as RAscH].
54. See Ferguson v. Vaughn Imported Cars, Inc., 9 Misc. 2d 188, 163
N.Y.S.2d 884 (Sup. Ct. 1957), where placing the deposit in the name 6f
another living person was held not to be a holding within the requirements
of the section.
55. Stuarco, Inc. v. Slafbro Realty Corp., 30 App. Div. 2d 80, 289
N.Y.S.2d 883 (2d Dep't 1968); In re Perfection Technical Servs. Press,
Inc., 22 App. Div. 2d 352, 256 N.Y.S.2d 166 (2d Dep't 1965); In re Izrue
Corp., 58 Misc. 2d 343, 295 N.Y.S.2d 204 (Sup. Ct. 1968); RASCH § 401.
56. In re Tru-Seal Aluminum Prods. Corp., 170 F. Supp. 902 (E.D.N.Y.
1959), aff'd, 278 F.2d 143 (2d Cir. 1960); In re Izrue Corp., 58 Misc. 2d 343,
295 N.Y.S.2d 204 (Sup. Ct. 1968); 2300 Concourse Realty Corp. v. Klug,
201 Misc. 179, 111 N.Y.S.2d 168 (Mun. Ct. 1952); cf. Tow v. Maidman,
56 Misc. 2d 468, 288 N.Y.S.2d 837 (Sup. Ct. 1968), where the tenant leased
property for which he deposited five thousand dollars as security. The
security was to be returned after termination of the lease, and the landlord
was granted the right, in the event of sale of the property, to transfer the
security to the vendee. At all relevant times, the security was maintained
in a separate account. When the property was sold by the landlord, a
closing adjustment apportioned as a credit to the vendee included tenant's
security. The tenant sought to recover his deposit on the theory that the
extension of credit for the security constituted a conversion. The court held
that although there was a momentary use of the security as a credit for the
vendor's benefit, no conversion would lie since there was no depletion of
the deposit. Id. at 470, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 839.
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then sue for conversion or counterclaim for the deposit in any action
by the landlord for rent." Finally, any agreement purporting to
waive any provision of section 7-103 is "absolutely void."5
A number of cases have qualified the proscription against com-
mingling by landlords." In an action by a tenant to recover his
deposit, it was held that the tenant was not entitled to recover his
security simply because the landlord temporarily placed the deposit
in a bank account containing his own funds."' The landlord had
segregated his deposit prior to commencement of the action and the
tenant had remained in possession of the premises.62
If the landlord can eschew liability by simply segregating the
deposit before the conclusion of the trial, 3 the tenant becomes a
double loser. Not only has he failed to reacquire his security, but
he has also incurred the expense of bringing the suit. The landlord's
57. Cherno v. Engine Air Serv., Inc., 330 F.2d 191 (2d Cir. 1964); In re
Radiant Syss., Inc., 253 F. Supp. 776 (E.D.N.Y. 1965); In re DeGregorio,
219 F. Supp. 783 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
58. Mercantile Exch. Leasing Corp. v. Astor-Broadway Holding Corp.,
3 App. Div. 2d 883, 161 N.Y.S.2d 677 (1st Dep't), aff'd, 4 N.Y.2d 910, 151
N.E.2d 92, 174 N.Y.S.2d 661 (1958); RASCH § 401.
59. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 7-103(3) (McKinney Supp. 1974); Ja-Mo
Associates, Inc. v. 56 Fulton St. Garage Corp., 30 App. Div. 2d 287, 291
N.Y.S.2d 63 (1st Dep't 1968); In re Izrue Corp., 58 Misc. 2d 343, 295
N.Y.S.2d 204 (Sup. Ct. 1968); 1970 Op. Arr'y GEN. 18.
60. 160 Realty Corp. v. 162 Realty Corp., 113 N.Y.S.2d 618 (Sup. Ct.),
aff'd, 280 App. Div. 762, 113 N.Y.S.2d 678 (1st Dep't 1952) (mem.) (where
the landlord commingled the security with his own funds, but prior to the
commencement of the action had segregated the deposit. The tenant was
held not entitled to a return of his security); Bridge Hardware Co. v.
Mayer, 131 N.Y.S.2d 823 (Sup. Ct. 1954) (where the landlord neglected to
place the security in a separate fund, but the evidence disclosed the de-
posit was intact and segregated in a special account prior to the conclusion
of trial. The court felt that 160 Realty Corp., supra, was indistinguishable);
accord, 19 North Village Realty Corp. v. Kominos, 3 Misc. 2d 768, 155
N.Y.S.2d 318 (Sup. Ct. 1956), aff'd, 3 App. Div. 2d 754, 160 N.Y.S.2d 825
(2d Dep't 1957).
61. 160 Realty Corp. v. 162 Realty Corp., 113 N.Y.S. 2d 618 (Sup. Ct.
1952).
62. Id. at 619. Generally, the lease must remain in force as well. See
note 60 supra.




statutory duty is phrased in absolute terms: security deposit money
he receives as trustee "shall not be mingled" with any of his per-
sonal moneys." Nowhere does it state, or can it be implied, that
such commingling can occur occasionally. 5 The statutory mandate
is clear, and continuing judicial refusal to follow the dictates of the
law will lead to the unjust expenditures of tenants' time, effort, and
money.
The landlord's duty to maintain the deposit intact and the ten-
ant's obligation to pay rent have been held to be mutually indepen-
dent.6 Therefore, the conversion of the security by the landlord will
not constitute a valid defense to a landlord's claim for rent. 7 The
purpose of section 7-103 is to accord the tenant greater protection
with respect to his security than he enjoyed at common law." If the
respective duties of the tenant and the landlord are to remain mu-
tually independent, the tenant faces two alternatives when a land-
lord converts his security: (a) he may choose to cease his rental
payments, in which case the landlord may institute a summary
proceeding to dispossess," or (b) if the tenant chooses to continue
his rent payments and sues to recover his deposit, he is faced with
the prospect of investing large amounts of time and money to re-
cover his security." For the knowledgeable landlord, the entire pro-
64. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 7-103(1) (McKinney Supp. 1974).
65. Id.
66. Turquoise Realty Corp. v. Burke, 168 Misc. 670, 6 N.Y.S.2d 125
(Mun. Ct. 1938).
67. Id. It has also been held that a landlord, having converted the
security deposit, may not set off his claims for unpaid rent where an as-
signee for the benefit of creditors seeks to recover the deposit. In re
Perfection Technical Servs. Press, Inc., 22 App. Div. 2d 352, 256 N.Y.S.2d
166 (2d Dep't), aff'd, 18 N.Y.2d 230, 273 N.Y.S.2d 71 (1965); In re John
Holst Co., 213 N.Y.S.2d 952 (Sup. Ct. 1961). Contra, Pollack v. Springer,
195 Misc. 523, 91 N.Y.S.2d 847 (N.Y. City Ct. 1949), where a landlord was
entitled to set off his judgment for unpaid rent in a suit by the tenant to
recover his security deposit.
68. See note 47 supra and accompanying text.
69. While the tenant may counterclaim for the conversion of his secu-
rity, the final result is that not only will he have been evicted, but the
landlord will have been able to use the security money profitably in the
interim.
70. A common theme voiced by several New York City Tenants' Asso-
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cedure thus becomes one of risks and basic economics. If the statute
is to effectively protect tenants, the tenant should be entitled to
use the conversion of his security as a set-off to a landlord's claim
for rent.
The sanctions imposed by this section of the statute are still
inadequate. Under section 7-103 the tenant is free to go into court
and seek redress for the landlord's breach.7' This procedure, how-
ever, is time-consuming and costly, with tenants often unable to
pursue their statutory. remedy because the cost of litigating would
be prohibitive, perhaps even exceeding the amount of recovery.72
The solution may simply require a more stringent civil remedy, such
as an award of punitive or treble damages. If this fails, a criminal
penalty could be appropriate."
IV. The Fate of a Security Deposit Upon a Tenant's Breach
Upon a tenant's breach of some or all of the covenants of a lease,
ciations during a series of interviews in August, 1974, was the reluctance
of many members to litigate in order to regain security that was equal to
the sum of one month's rent.
71. Mercantile Exch. Leasing Corp. v. Astor-Broadway Holding Corp.,
3 App. Div. 2d 883, 161 N.Y.S.2d 677 (1st Dep't), aff'd, 4 N.Y.2d 910, 151
N.E.2d 92, 174 N.Y.S.2d 661 (1958); RASCH § 401.
72. It has been stated that "the usual way to force a citizen to observe
higher standards of conduct is by the use of criminal sanctions." Quinn &
Phillips, The Law of Landlord-Tenant: A Critical Evaluation of the Past
with Guidelines for the Future, 38 FORDHAm L. REv. 225, 239 (1970). In
People v. Klinger, 164 Misc. 530, 300 N.Y.S. 408 (Magis. Ct. 1937), the
landlord was held criminally liable for the misappropriation of the tenant's
security deposit. The court felt, however, that criminal liability was dic-
tated by sections 1290 and 1302 of the Penal Law, not by section 233 of
the Real Property Law (now N.Y. GEN. OBUG. LAW § 7-103 (McKinney
Supp. 1974)). Cf. People v. Horowitz, 309 N.Y. 426, 131 N.E.2d 715 (1956),
where the defendant was also prosecuted for his refusal to return the ten-
ant's security. The court never decided whether such conduct was criminal
since section 233 of the Real Property Law did not, at that time, apply to
license agreements.
73. Section 7-105 provides criminal sanctions for failure to adhere to
its dictates. The impetus for the statute was the legislative desire to pro-
vide- greater protection to tenants. To ensure strict compliance by land-
lords, a remedy as potent as that provided by section 7-105 should be made
available to enforce violations of section 7-103.
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the fate of a security deposit is governed by common law.7" The
deposit is either treated as a penalty, for which the sum acts as
payment of a portion or all of the landlord's actual damages, or as
liquidated damages, in which case the sum is treated as the equiva-
lent of the landlord's prospective loss. 5 Whether a security deposit
is to be construed as a penalty or as liquidated damages remains a
fundamental contract question. The literal language of the lease is
not determinative.7 6
Courts will generally construe a security deposit as a penalty
where damages flowing from the breach are readily ascertainable at
the signing of the lease, or where the amount fixed by the lease is
plainly disproportionate to the actual injury. 77 Where actual dam-
ages exceed the sum of the deposit, the landlord may elect to keep
the deposit and hold the tenant liable for the difference.7 1 Where
actual damages are less than the sum of the deposit, the tenant is
entitled to a refund of the difference.79
74. See RASCH § 379.
75. Id.
76. The agreement must be construed according to the contract's
terms, the parties' intent, and the surrounding circumstances. Feinsot v.
Burstein, 78 Misc. 259, 138 N.Y.S. 185 (Sup. Ct. 1912), aff'd, 161 App. Div.
651, 146 N.Y.S. 939 (1st Dep't), aff'd, 213 N.Y. 703, 108 N.E. 1093 (1914).
Construction leases also apply this test. Mosler Safe Co. v. Maiden Lane
Safe Deposit Co., 199 N.Y. 479, 93 N.E. 81 (1910); Ward v. Hudson River
Bldg. Co., 125 N.Y. 230, 26 N.E. 256 (1891).
77. The lease must be interpreted as of its date and not as of the breach
in construing the intended application of the security deposit. Seidlitz v.
Auerbach, 230 N.Y. 167, 129 N.E. 461 (1920). The distinction here is that
the precise sum was not of the essence of the agreement, but rather in the
nature of security for performance. See Ward v. Hudson River Bldg. Co.,
125 N.Y. 230, 26 N.E. 256 (1891); Mann v. Taylor, 258 App. Div. 461, 17
N.Y.S.2d 121 (2d Dep't 1940); Realworth Properties, Inc. v. Bachler, 33
Misc. 2d 39, 223 N.Y.S.2d 910 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
78. See Caesar v. Rubinson, 174 N.Y. 492, 67 N.E. 58 (1903).
79. The principle was first applied in Seidlitz v. Auerbach, 230 N.Y.
167, 129 N.E. 461 (1920). The landlord is not confined to the deposit as a
remedy, but if he does resort to it, he will be entitled to no more of it than
will make him whole; that is, to indemnify him for the actual damages he
may have sustained by reason of the breach. See also Peinson v. Lloyds
First Mortgage Co., 260 N.Y. 214, 183 N.E. 368 (1932); Prudential West-
chester Corp. v. Tomasino, 5 App. Div. 2d 489, 172 N.Y.S.2d 652 (1st Dep't
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For the deposit to be construed as liquidated damages, the parties
must have shown an attempt to apportion the amount of the deposit
to the probable loss that would flow from the breach." Thus, if it
appears that the anticipated loss from the tenant's default is uncer-
tain and incapable of exact measurement, or if the deposit is reason-
ably proportionate to the actual injury flowing from the breach, the
parties' stipulation of the deposit as "liquidated damages" in the
lease will be honored.' The parties' agreement must not be "but a
cloak of language to attempt to hide a sum which is out of propor-
tion to, and differs greatly from, the actual damages which would
in the ordinary course be suffered. 8 ' In cases that might reasonably
be decided either way, the tendency of courts is to interpret the
deposit as a general security measure to compensate for actual dam-
ages and therefore to treat it as a penalty.'8 3
The above tests are applied where a lease is comprised of several
covenants of varying degrees of importance to the whole. In Seidlitz
1958), afJ'd, 6 N.Y.2d 824, 159 N.E.2d 699, 188 N.Y.S.2d 214 (1959); Folger
v. Raczek, 167 App. Div. 167, 152 N.Y.S. 1041 (2d Dep't 1915). But the
tenant must await the original expiration date of the lease before claiming
a return of the deposit, since only then can all of the landlord's damages
be ascertained. See Milton M. Senz, Inc. v. Hammer, 265 N.Y. 344, 193
N.E. 168 (1934); Henochstein v. Nachman, 218 App. Div. 673, 219 N.Y.S.
199 (1st Dep't 1926).
80. "The parties must not lose sight of the principle of compensation,"
urged Judge Andrews in Seidlitz v. Auerbach, 230 N.Y. 167, 174, 129 N.E.
461, 463 (1920). Here, actual damages were found plainly disproportionate
to the damages fixed as "liquidated" in the lease.
81. J. & H. Garage, Inc. v. H. Flow Corp., 225 App. Div. 65, 232 N.Y.S.
242 (1st Dep't 1928), aff'd, 251 N.Y. 553, 168 N.E. 424 (1929). The court
held that the deposit, fixed as "liquidated damages," was not shown to
differ markedly from the damages "suffered in the ordinary course," so as
to require the court to disregard the express stipulation of the parties. See
Realworth Properties, Inc. v. Bachler, 33 Misc. 2d 39, 223 N.Y.S.2d 910
(Sup. Ct. 1962), in which the landlord's actual loss was held to have been
incapable of computation at the time of the parties' agreement. Thus, the
stipulation of the deposit as "liquidated damages" had neither been unrea-
sonable nor unconscionable.
82. J. & H. Garage, Inc. v. H. Flow Corp., 225 App, Div. 65, 67, 232
N.Y.S. 242,' 244 (1st Dep't 1928).
83. City of New York v. Brooklyn & Manhattan Ferry Co., 238 N.Y.
52, 143 N.E. 788 (1924).
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v. Auerbach84 the tenant's deposit of $7,500 was paid "[a]s security
for the faithful performance by the tenant of all the covenants and
agreements herein contained and to indemnify the landlord against
loss by reason of any such default ... ."I' The covenants included
such minor duties as keeping the sidewalk free from snow, and
payment of premiums for an insurance policy. The tenant, who
breached and was evicted for his failure to pay one month's rent,
brought the action to recover the value of his security deposit less
actual amages. Rejecting the language of the lease," the court
construed the deposit as a penalty. Thus, plaintiff was awarded the
remainder of the deposit.87 The test is whether the security is out of
proportion to the ascertainable damages flowing from the material
breach in the ordinary course of events.18
In J. & H. Garage, Inc. v. H. Flow Corp. ,89 the lease itself provided
that the security deposit was to be treated as liquidated damages
only if the premises were surrendered or if the tenant was dispos-
sessed prior to the lease's expiration. The tenant was subsequently
evicted for nonpayment of rent. On the facts, the court found that
a reasonable estimate of the actual damages did not vary dispropor-
84. 230 N.Y. 167, 129 N.E. 461 (1920).
85. Id. at 170, 129 N.E. at 462.
86. The lease included the following provision: "[A]s the damages
which the landlord would sustain in the event of a default by the tenant
hereunder would not be susceptible of ascertainment, it is hereby coven-
anted and agreed between the landlord and tenant that in the event of any
such default the damages sustained by the said landlord be and they are
hereby fixed and liquidated at the amount of seven thousand five hundred
dollars so deposited as aforesaid, without any deduction or offset what-
ever." Id. at 170-71, 129 N.E. at 462.
87. The court noted: "It is impossible to believe that the lessor and the
lessees intended that the sum of $7500 should be treated alike as liquidated
damages for the breach of a covenant involving the payment of many
thousand dollars of rent and of a covenant involving the payment of an
insurance premium of $17." Id. at 174, 129 N.E. at 463.
88. The leading case is Hackenheimer v. Kurtzmann, 235 N.Y. 57, 138
N.E. 735 (1923), in which the court held that it was the parties' clear
intention that the deposit be security against an intentional violation of a
promise made by defendant not to injure the company name by private
use. The plaintiff had bought defendant's majority share of the company
in an agreement that contained many lesser covenants.
89' 225 App. Div. 65, 232 N.Y.S. 242 (1st Dep't 1928).
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tionately from the ten thousand dollar deposit. The court thus con-
strued the deposit according to its literal language as liquidated
damages, and accorded plaintiff ten thousand dollars as full recov-
ery for its loss."
Not all money deposited by a tenant is intended as security to
guarantee performance of the lease. Where money is deposited for
a different purpose, such-as prepayment of rent, the fate of the sum
upon a breach is apparently a matter of common law.9 Confusion
in this area has resulted from an ambiguity in section 7-103(1).
Because the statute limits its protection to money deposited as "se-
curity,"" there are cases holding that a landlord does not become a
trustee of the money so deposited if he received it as a prepayment
of rent." With this arrangement, he may avoid becoming a trustee
1
90. The appellate division noted that the total rent was $19,000 an-
nually, that vacating the premises would mean several months loss of rent
in addition to the cost for repairs. The court found that the tenants' deposit
was a reasonable ascertainment of actual damages. Id. at 67, 232 N.Y.S.
at 244-45; cf. Lenco, Inc. v. Hirschfeld, 247 N.Y. 44, 159 N.E. 718 (1928).
Here the lease provided that a tenant's deposit be retained as liquidated
damages in the event of a breach of any covenant. With twenty years
remaining on it, the lease also stipulated that the tenant would remain
liable for rent losses suffered by the landlord for the duration. The court
construed the deposit as a penalty. Upon evidence that the landlord was
attempting in good faith to relet the premises, the court held that plain-
tiff's action to recover the security was premature. Recovery had to await
the liquidation of the landlord's actual loss. Id. at 50, 159 N.E. at 720.
Logically, Lenco would have been decided differently had the parties
agreed to accept the deposit as liquidated damages specifically for a mate-
rial breach, such as the loss of future rents ensuing in. the ordinary course
"from an eviction.
91. Courts will attempt to ascertain the intention of the parties by
examining the lease in light of all the circumstances relevant to its forma-
tion. Prudential Westchester Corp. v. Tomasino, 5 App. Div. 2d 489, 172
N.Y.S.2d 652 (1st Dep't 1958); aff'd, 6 N.Y.2d 824, 159 N.E.2d 699, 188
N.Y.S.2d 214 (1959).
92. See note 41 supra.
93. In re Dilbert's Leasing & Dev. Corp., 345 F.2d 172"(2d Cir. 1965);
34 W. 34th St. Corp. v. Nehama Realty Corp., 7 Misc. 2d 532, 153 N.Y.S.2d
427 (Sup. Ct. 1956). In the latter case the court said: "There is no doubt
that a lease may provide for payment of the rent in any manner or at any
time that the parties elect. Section 233 of the Real Property Law [now
N.Y. GEN. OBUG. LAW § 7-103(1) (McKinney Supp. 1974)] provides that
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of the tenant's deposit by simply choosing to describe the money
received as prepaid rent instead of security, in which case the land-
lord merely occupies the position of debtor. 4 The distinction is espe-
cially significant when a landlord becomes bankrupt and has al-
ready commingled a tenant's prepayment with his own personal
funds. In a suit brought by a tenant to recover the entire deposit
from the bankrupt's assignee, a federal court 5 held that the
bankrupt was a mere debtor as to that portion of the tenant's de-
posit which was stipulated in the lease as the prepayment of rent."
Therefore, the landlord was not guilty of conversion, and the tenant
was not entitled to priority over the landlord's general creditors."
In a more recent decision," however, a lower New York court moved
to curb the inequities that result from such a literal interpretation
of the statute. The court held a landlord liable for commingling a
tenant's prepayment of rent with his personal funds." It said:
An examination of the words of the statute makes it clear that it is applicable
whether the deposit was made "as security for performance of the contract
or agreement or to be applied to payments upon such contract or agreement
when due." Thus whether called security or prepaid rent, the statute is
applicable to these deposits.1®
Consistent with its liberal interpretation of the statute, the court
disregarded the earlier cases which held section 7-103(1) inapplica-
ble on substantially similar facts.'1'
"when money is deposited as security or to be applied to payments when
due, such money is to be held in trust by the person receiving it. According
to the provisions of this lease, the amount in question is neither security
nor to be applied to payments when due. As long as the lease is the contract
between the parties there can be no conversion." 7 Misc. 2d at 533, 153
N.Y.S.2d at 428.
94. See note 93 supra.
95. In re Dilbert's Leasing & Dev. Corp., 345 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1965).
96. Id. at 173.
97. Id. The court held that the landlord's commingling of the prepaid
rent with his personal funds, followed by his bankruptcy, relegated the
tenant to the status of creditor.
98. Purfield v. Kathrane, 73 Misc. 2d 194, 341 N.Y.S.2d 376 (Civ. Ct.
1973).
99. Id. at 200, 341 N.Y.S.2d at 382.
100. Id. at 199, 341 N.Y.S.2d at 382 (citation omitted).
101. The court noted that the prepayment was specified as "security"
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To place continued reliance upon the reasoning of earlier cases
would violate the spirit of the statute. Section 7-103 was enacted to
eliminate basic inequities that existed between landlord and tenant
at common law." 2 While the statute speaks only of money deposited
as "security," this term should be liberally construed to encompass
money that is deposited with the landlord as prepayment of rent.
V. Interest Provisions
A changing and presently controversial area of landlord-tenant
law concerns the accrual of interest upon a security deposit. The
issue has provoked ligitation over sums both large and small. 10
Prior to statutory regulation, the law was well-settled. In the ab-
sence of a specific agreement to pay interest on a deposit, none was
chargeable.0 4 However, if an agreement exists to pay "interest at
the legal rate," the landlord was obligated to pay the statutory
interest rate.0 5 This has not been changed by statute.06
In a recent case,0 7 a tenant deposited a sum of money with his
landlord as security for the performance of the lease. The landlord
invested the deposit in government bonds and collected the interest
earned. Instead of retaining this interest in trust for the tenant, the
landlord used it for his own benefit. The appellate division, in enun-
ciating the prevailing rule, said:
[Tihe plaintiff-tenant is entitled to the interest actually accrued ...by
operation of law, despite the absence of any agreement to pay interest on the
in the lease. However this fact alone did not control the court's decision.
Id. at 199-200, 341 N.Y.S.2d at 382.
102. See note 47 supra and accompanying text.
103. New York v. Parkchester Apts. Co., 61 Misc. 2d 1020, 307
N.Y.S.2d 741 (Sup. Ct. 1970), where at issue was whether interest could
be collected on over one million dollars in security deposits. Parmaki v.
Levine, 75 Misc. 2d 900, 349 N.Y.S.2d 979 (Civ. Ct. 1973), where the issue
concerned recovery of $22.26 of interest on a security deposit.
104. Boughton v. Flint, 74 N.Y. 476 (1878); In re Cromwell's Estate,
102 Misc. 503, 169 N.Y.S. 204 (Sup. Ct. 1918); RAsCH § 399.
105. Levy v. Shellsey, 30 Misc. 789, 63 N.Y.S. 150 (Sup. Ct. 1900);
RAscH § 399.
106. N.Y. GEN. OBUG. LAW § 7-103(j) (McKinney Supp. 1974):
"[Wlith interest accruing thereon, if any . . . ." Id. (emphasis added).
107. Stuarco, Inc. v. Slafbro Realty Corp., 30 App. Div. 2d 80, 289
N.Y.S.2d 883 (2d Dep't 1968).
[Vol. III
SECURITY DEPOSITS
deposit, and this precisely and only because interest was in fact earned
thereon. Also, the accrued interest itself earned no interest and the plaintiff
is not entitled to interest on interest either or by operation of law or agree-
ment of the parties.' M
In 1970, statutory law, providing that a landlord, or holder, was
under no duty to, place the deposit in an interest bearing account,
underwent significant revision. The legislature amended section 7-
103 of the General Obligations Law to require that all security de-
posited for a building containing six or more apartment units be
placed in interest bearing accounts.' 0 The statute already required
that this money be held separately from the holder's personal
funds."'
Reform was spurred by a harsh but logical decision in New York
v. Parkchester Apartments Co.,"' which stated"' that a purchaser
of an apartment building acted properly when he transferred one
million dollars in security deposits from interest bearing accounts,
where they had been placed voluntarily by the former landlord,"'
to non-interest bearing accounts."' Since the new landlord was then
108. Id. at 82, 289 N.Y.S.2d at 885-86.
109. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 7-103(2-a) (McKinney Supp. 1974) is
ambiguous with regard to which deposits must be placed in interest bear-
ing accounts. However, an informal opinion of the Attorney General is
consistent with the message of the Governor that accompanied the amend-
ment. Both interpreted it as requiring only that tenants rent an apartment
of whatever size in a building of six or more living units. 1970 Op. Arr'y
GEN. 163; RASCH § 399 n.17.2.
110. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 7-103(2) (McKinney Supp. 1974).
111. 61 Misc. 2d 1020, 307 N.Y.S.2d 741 (Sup. Ct. 1970). Litigation in
Parkchester was concluded in February, 1970, and the legislature passed
section 7-103(2-a) giving tenants greater rights over interest on their secu-
rity deposits in April of that year.
112. The court held that the suit brought by the Attorney General
should be dismissed for lack of standing. Id. at 1026, 307 N.Y.S.2d at 748.
See text accompanying note 132 infra.
113. The defendant was clearly not in violation of section 7-103(1)
which then read in part: "Whenever money shall be deposited . . . on a
contract . . . for the . . . rental of real property as security for perform-
ance of the contract. . . such money, with interest accruing thereon, if any
• . . shall be held in trust . . . ." N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 7-103(1)
(McKinney 1964).
114. 61 Misc. 2d at 1026, 307 N.Y.S.2d at 748.
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under no statutory obligation to continue the former landlord's pol-
icy, annual payments of interest to tenants legally ceased.
Section 7-103 does not apply to a building with less than six
dwelling units; an owner of such building is under no obligation to
deposit the security in a banking organization." 5 However reasona-
ble this limitation appears on its face, it is an exception that invites
abuse. Where a landlord operates suburban cluster housing, for ex-
ample, or several city brownstones of less than six units, his tenants
are apparently left unprotected by the statute. A landlord may own
numerous buildings of one to five units each, yet these tenants will
be denied statutory protection simply because each building con-
tains less than six units."'6 The requirement'that a landlord deposit
a security should be based on the number of tenants per landlord
rather than units per building.
Under present law, landlords who deposit security in a banking
organization must notify tenants in writing of the name and address
of the bank, and of the amounts of their deposits."7 If the landlord
deposits the security in an interest bearing account, either voluntar-
ily or as required by law, he is entitled to receive, as an administra-
tive expense, a sum equivalent to "one percent per annum upon the
security money so deposited.""' The balance of the interest is to
remain the property of the depositor and shall either continue to be
held in trust by the lessor or be paid annually to the person making
the deposit."' A letter issued by the Office of the Attorney General2 0
and at least one court decision'2 ' interpreted the above language to
mean that the tenant has the right to an annual payment of his
interest, unless it was agreed in the lease that the interest would
115. N.Y. GEN. OBUG. LAW § 7-103(2-a) (McKinney Supp. 1974).
116. Id.
117. Id. § 7-103(2); 1970 Op. ATT'y GEN. 17.
118. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 7-103(2) (McKinney Supp. 1974); RAscH
§ 399. This provision is in lieu of all other administration expenses incurred
by the landlord.
119. N.Y. GEN OBUG. LAW § 7-103(2) (McKinney Supp. 1974); see, e.g.,
Parmaki v. Levine, 75 Misc. 2d 900, 349 N.Y.S.2d 979 (Civ. Ct. 1973);
RAsCH § 399.
120. See Parmaki v. Levine, 75 Misc. 2d 900, 349 N.Y.S.2d 979, 980
(Civ. Ct. 1973).
121. Id. at 901, 349 N.Y.S.2d at 981.
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apply as rent. The Attorney General has instructed tenants to de-
mand that interest be paid or used toward rents annually.'22
The language of section 7-103(2-a) is unclear as to whether it may
be applied to security deposits received prior to its passage.2 3 A
recent New York Supreme Court decision, People ex. rel Lefkowitz
v. Parker'4 (Parker 11), held that the law did apply. Defendant-
landlord had argued that the legislature intended only that the
landlord guarantee interest on deposits acquired after 1970.25 This
reasoning would produce an inequitable result. Tenants who depos-
ited security prior to the amendment's passage would be denied an
equal right to collect interest with newer tenants, even though all
tenants enjoy the same status of cestui que trust.' 6 Nevertheless it
must be recognized that the amendment makes no provision for
such retroactive application.In
VI. Enforcement Power for the Attorney General
A related and equally significant addition to the General Obliga-
tions Law is section 7-107,21 which broadly increases the power of
122. Office of the Attorney General, Press Release, July 26, 1974.
123. That is, does the amendment apply to a landlord who owns a
building containing six or more units, who received security deposits prior
to 1970, but who continues to hold the funds in non-interest bearing ac-
counts?
124. 78 Misc. 2d 224, 356 N.Y.S.2d 809 (Sup. Ct. 1974). This action was
a re-institution of People v. Parker, 30 N.Y.2d 964, 287 N.E.2d 618, 335
N.Y.S.2d 827 (1972) (Parker I) which was dismissed on the ground that the
Attorney General had no standing to bring the suit. See note 133 infra and
accompanying text. This decision, however, has been appealed. The ap-
peal questions the decision of the New York Supreme Court which held
that both section 7-103(2-a) and section 7-107 are applicable retroactively.
125. 78 Misc. 2d at 224, 356 N.Y.S.2d at 810.
126. The amendment did not alter the tenant's statutory status with
respect to the landlord's holding of security deposits. Before and after the
amendment the tenant is cestui que trust for deposits held by the landlord.
The rights of tenants who deposited money prior to the amendment
should, therefore, be the same as those who deposit moneys after the
amendment was enacted.
127. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 7-103(2-a) (McKinney Supp. 1974).
128. Section 7-107, added by the Legislature in 1973, states: "If it
appears to the attorney general that any person, association, or corporation
has violated or is violating any of the provisions of title one of this article,
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the Attorney General to bring suit for violations of related sections
pertaining to security deposits. Previously, the state drew authority
to prosecute from section 63(12) of the Executive Law.' 9 Under that
statute's test of "persistent fraud or illegality,""'3 the court in New
York v. Parkchester Apartments Co. 3 refused to grant the Attorney
General standing to sue. Tenants who had sought to compel
defendant-landlord to pay interest on their security deposits were
thus denied collective relief. The court in Parkchester held that a
mere breach of contract-even had it existed-did not constitute an
"illegal act" allowing the Attorney General to prosecute.," By the
same reasoning, after the passage of the new interest provisions
allowing individual tenants to bring suit, the court of appeals dis-
missed the Attorney General's suit for lack of standing 33 in People
ex. rel Lefkowitz v. Parker'34 (Parker I). The court, however, voiced
its annoyance with the defendant for his failure to transfer security
deposits into interest bearing accounts as required by law.' 35 But the
strongest support came from the dissent of Judge Jasen:
31
an action or proceeding may be instituted by the attorney general in the
name of the people of the state of New York to compel compliance with
such provisions and enjoin any violation or threatened violation thereof."
Id. § 7-107.
129. Enacted in 1951, this law empowered the Attorney General to
prosecute "whenever any person shall engage in repeated fraudulent or
illegal acts or otherwise demonstrate persistent fraud or illegality, in the
carrying on, or conducting, or transaction of business .. . ." N.Y. EXEC.
LAW § 63(12) (McKinney 1972).
130. Id.
131. 61 Misc. 2d 1020, 307 N.Y.S.2d 741 (Sup. Ct. 1970).
132. Id. at 1026-27, 307 N.Y.S.2d at 748.
133. The Attorney General relied unsuccessfully upon N.Y. ExEc. LAW
§ 63(12) (McKinney 1972).
134. 30 N.Y.2d 964, 287 N.E.2d 618, 335 N.Y.S.2d 827 (1972)..
135. The court of appeals left no doubt that sections 7-103(2-a) and (2-
b) were applicable retrospectively. In dismissing the complaint solely on
the ground that the Attorney General then lacked standing, the court said:
"Dismissal is without prejudice to such other action or proceeding as . ..
may be advised, by or on behalf of the tenants as owners of the deposits
held in trust by the landlords, to compel compliance with [§ 7-103(2-a)]
or to such other action or proceeding by public authority as may be
authorized and appropriate." Id. at 965, 287 N.E.2d at 619, 335 N.Y.S.2d
at 828.
136. The dissenting judges said that section 63(12) of the Executive
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Obviously, the legislature intended to put an end to the nonsense of security
deposit manipulation by landlords requiring that all rent security be depos-
ited in interest bearing accounts. To construe the statute any other way
would clearly defeat the remedial purpose intended.13
After passage of section 7-107, Parker was relitigated' 31 and the
Attorney General was successful in his reliance on the statute to
enforce the landlord's duty to transfer deposits into interest bearing
accounts.' 39 Moreover, the court ordered defendant-landlord to pay
his tenants over one hundred thousand dollars in interest accruing
since 1970.'1 0
The issue currently on appeal in Parker 11 concerns the lower
court's holding that section 7-107 is applicable retroactively,"' al-
lowing the Attorney General to prosecute all prior and continuing
violations of the security deposit legislation."' The Parker litigation
has already been a catalyst for tenants' complaints to the New York
Municipal Frauds Bureau.'
VII. Transfer of a Security Deposit Upon Landlord's
Conveyance of the Fee
Section 7-105 of the General Obligations Law complements the
provisions of sections 7-103 and 7-107. It provides for the orderly
transfer of deposits from a former holder to a new one. Violation of
this section is a misdemeanor.'
Law was sufficient to give the Attorney General standing to sue. Id. at 967,
287 N.E.2d at 619, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 829.
137. Id. at-966, 287 N.E.2d at 619, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 828.
138. People ex rel Lefkowitz v. Parker, 78 Misc. 2d 224, 356 N.Y.S.2d
809 (Sup. Ct. 1974).
139. See note 128 supra and accompanying text.
140. 78 Misc. 2d at 226, 356 N.Y.S.2d at 811.
141. See notes 123-27 supra and accompanying text.
142. The court said:"'By its very terms it is applicable to past as well
as future violations of Article 7. The only significance of its effective date
(July 1, 1973) is that after that date the hand of the Attorney General was
loosened. The section does not and appears not to have been intended to
limit the People to policing only prospective violations of Article 7." 78
Misc. 2d at 225, 356 N.Y.S.2d at 811.
143. Interview with Meyer Menscher, Prosecutor for the Miscellaneous
Frauds Bureau of the Office of the Attorney General of New York, in New
York City, August 1, 1974.
144. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 7-105 (McKinney Supp. 1974).
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This section was amended in 1974 to limit the holder's options in
a transferral of a security deposit. 4 1 Upon conveyance of the fee, he
will no longer be free to retain the money until termination of his
lease, nor may he return the deposit directly to tenants. He must
turn the security deposit over to the person assuming control of the
property.'" Moreover, the former holder is under a statutory duty
to notify his tenants of the transaction.'47 However, the provisions
of section 7-105 may be voided by prior agreement of the parties.'
The principle applied in section 7-105 is that the benefits of the
personal covenant to pay a security deposit run with the land. The
statute acknowledges the new owner's right to protection from a
tenant's failure to perform the terms of a lease.' 4 Thus, courts have
held that a grantee of real estate is entitled to the benefits of a
deposit made by a tenant to the original landlord.'5 ° Upon the ten-
ant's default the new owner. may sue his grantor for damages up to
the amount of such deposit.' 5' However, since the burden of the
covenant to return a deposit is personal and does not run with the
land, "'52 a grantee of a fee who receives no security deposit cannot be
held liable to a tenant for its return. 5 3 The only means by which the
grantor-landlord may escape liability is by turning over the deposit
in accordance with the dictates of the statute.'54 Minor noncompli-




149. See Halsted v. Globe Indem. Co., 258 N.Y. 176, 179 N.E. 376
(1932).
150. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Stephen Realty Co., 178 Misc. 53,
33 N.Y.S.2d 146 (N.Y. City Ct. 1942); RASCH § 391.
151. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Stephen Realty Co., 178 Misc. 53,
33 N.Y.S.2d 146 (N.Y. City Ct. 1942); Donnelly v. Rosoff, 164 Misc. 384,
298 N.Y.S. 946 (Mun. Ct. 1937).
152. Mallory Associates v. Barving Realty Co., 300 N.Y. 297, 90 N.E.2d
468 (1949); Joseph Fallert Brewing Co. v. Blass, 119 App. Div. 53, 103
N.Y.S. 865 (2d Dep't 1907).
153. Halsted v. Globe Indem. Co., 258 N.Y. 176, 179 N.E. 376 (1932).
154. N.Y. GEN. OaUG. LAW § 7-105(1) (McKinney Supp. 1974).
155. Tow v. Maidman, 56 Misc. 2d 468, 288 N.Y.S.2d 837 (Sup. Ct.
1968). Here a tenant was aware of the name and address of the landlord's
grantee, and subsequently made payments to the grantee of rents due
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ance has been tolerated,'55 but courts have not tolerated any convey-
ance that poses a substantial risk to the tenant's security.' 6
The statute does not control the fate of a security deposit upon
the tenant's assignment of a lease.'57 But the common law is clear
that the landlord may retain any deposit made by the assignor-
tenant to secure-performance, unless the landlord were to discharge
him by agreement.'5 8 Thus, the assignee does not have a right to the
deposit held in trust for the assignor, unless the latter expressly
relinquished his rights to the deposit upon fulfillment of the cove-
nants of the lease.'59
VIII. Conclusion
The current litigation over interest has spurred new activity
within the tenant associations of New York City. There has been an
effort to publicize Parker II as a means of encouraging valid claims
against recalcitrant landlords.6 0 Indeed, the Municipal Frauds Bu-
reau of the Attorney General's Office reports an increase of claims
as a result of Parker 11.161
The present activity in fact understates the frustrating problems
tenants commonly encounter concerning their security deposits.
under the lease. The fact that the notice of the deposit's transfer failed to
give the grantee's name and address did not entitle tenant to recover his
deposit.
156. Stuarco, Inc. v. Slafbro Realty, 30 App. Div. 2d 80, 289 N.Y.S.2d
883 (2d Dep't 1968), where a former landlord had transferred tenants'
security to a grantee midway through a renewed lease. The court ordered
him to pay tenants all interest that had actually accrued while the former
landlord had been in possession. In Purfield v. Kathrane, 73 Misc. 2d 194,
341 N.Y.S.2d 376 (Civ. Ct. 1973), the court held that the notification
provisions of sections 7-103(2) and 7-105(1)(a) had been violated, and
found defendant-landlord liable for conversion.
157. N.Y. GEN. OBUG. LAw § 7-105 (McKinney Supp. 1974).
158. Piser v. Hecht, 170 App. Div. 668, 156 N.Y.S. 601 (1st Dep't 1915).159. Shattuck v. Buek, 158 App. Div. 709, 143 N.Y.S. 1045 (1st Dep't
1913); Wertheimer v. Marks, 81 Misc. 137, 142 N.Y.S. 331 (Sup. Ct. 1913).
160. Interviews with representatives of several New York City tenant's
associations reflect an increasing number of complaints after publication
of the decision in Parker I.
161. Interview with Meyer Menscher, prosecutor for the Miscellaneous
Frauds Bureau of the Office of the Attorney General of New York, in New
York City, August 1, 1974.
/19741
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL
Often the disputes concern relatively small sums of money. A ten-
ant, uncertain of his rights, may be reluctant to file,# complaint or
bring suit himself. He may feel that the spector of a protracted
dispute imposes a greater burden than it is worth. Thus, an individ-
ual tenant, with relatively little at stake, and with only the desire
to be finished with the whole distasteful business, is tempted to give
up and forget, if not forgive.
The statute has done much to improve the lot of the tenant and
to eliminate many of the inequities that existed at common law.' 2
Where the landlord once was regarded as merely the tenants'
debtor, he now occupies the position of trustee.'63 Where he was once
allowed to play fast and loose with the tenants' security, he must
now, at the very least, segregate the deposit and keep it intact.'4 He
is even required, in some instances, to place the security in an
interest bearing account.'65 Tenants should be made aware that in
these situations they have the protection of the law, and that the
literal language of the lease is not the final word.
As substantial as these revisions may have been, they are not
sufficient. While a tenant is afforded a remedy for conversion of his
security, this remedy is inadequate. Confronted with the expense of
litigation, the individual tenant may abandon all efforts to seek
redress. His vehicle of enforcement becomes, in effect, no vehicle at
all. With regard to a landlord's conversion, it is not clear that the
tenants' statutory remedy strengthens their prior position., An al-
ternative method of enforcement must be made available to ten-
ants. It is submitted that a criminal sanction, or at least a monetary
civil penalty, should be enacted into law to halt a landlord's re-
peated conversions of security deposits for his own purposes.' 7
There should also be a re-examination of the decisions which
allow a landlord to temporarily commingle the tenant's security
with his personal funds without being subject to liability.," The
162. See notes 41-47 supra and accompanying text.
163. See notes 42-44 supra and accompanying text.
164. See note 44 supra and accompanying text.
165. See note 109 supra and accompanying text.
166. See notes 66-70 supra and accompanying text.
167. See notes 72-73 supra and accompanying text.
168. See notes 60-62 supra and accompanying text.
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statute should not be open to such interpretation.'" That such hold-
ings are wooden and restrictive is demonstrated by the tenant who
sues for the conversion of his security, only to have the landlord
segregate the deposit prior to conclusion of the trial.
Recent decisions have also established the independence of the
duty to pay rent from the duty to segregate the tenants' security.7 0
The statute was enacted to deal with a practical problem,"' and its
effectiveness will only be eroded by continued judicial acceptance
of this principle.
For some tenants the development of security deposit law can
mean very little, perhaps the gain of a few dollars that were not
likely to be missed. Yet this is not to say that a stronger law will
not be felt.
The law of landlord-tenant is the law to most low income dwellers, and it
instructs them everyday on the value society places on basic fairness and the
social classes it prefers.'
It is for these people, the low income dwellers, that security deposit
legislation assumes particular importance.
Stevens Ingraham
Paul J. Yesawich, III
169. See notes 63-65 supra and accompanying text.
170. See cases cited notes 66-67 supra.
171. The legislature's primary purpose was to establish that landlords
were to be trustees of a tenant's money and not creditors free to use the
money for their private ends. See note 46 supra and accompanying text.
172. Quinn & Phillips, The Law of Landlord-Tenant: A Critical Evalu-
ation of the Past with Guidelines for the Future, 38 FORDHAM L. REv. 225,
258 (1969).
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